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ERRATUM 
 
  Songzi Du pointed out to us that the proof of Lemma 5.5 in “The Folk Theorem 
with Imperfect Public Information” (Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin, Econometrica 
(1994)) is incorrect. The lemma is valid as stated. Here is a correct proof; the notation 
and all cited lemmas are taken from the original paper. 
 
  Lemma 5.5: If a pure-action profile is enforceable, and pairwise identifiable for 
all pairs of players, it is enforceable with respect to all regular hyperplanes. 
 
  Proof:   Suppose pure action profile 
* a is enforceable, and pairwise identifiable 
for all pairs i,j; normalize payoffs by setting 
* ( ) 0 g a =  .  By lemma 4.3,  enforceability 
on hyperplanes is independent of the discount factor and the overall payoff to be 
enforced, so we can set the discount factor to ½ and the overall payoff to be 0.  Thus for 
each player i there is a continuation payoff function  i w  such that    
(1)  * * * ( | ( , ) ( ) ( , ) with equality if  =  . i i i i i i i i y y a a w y g a a a a − − ≤ − ∑ π  
By lemma 5.3, it is sufficient to consider pairwise hyperplanes, so we want to show that 
for any pair  , j k  and non-zero coefficients  , j k β β  there are continuation payoff functions 
' ' , j k w w  that satisfy (1) and also satisfy  ' ' ( ) ( ) 0 j j k k w y w y y β β + = ∀ .  Substituting  
' ' ( ) ( / ) ( ) k j k j w y w y β β = −  our goal is to find   '
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Now consider the linear programming problem of maximizing the constant objective 
function 0 subject to the constraints (2); this problem has a solution if (and only if) the 
dual is bounded. 
The dual of this LP is  
(3) * *
, max ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
j k j j k k j j j j j k k k k k a A a A a g a a a g a a µ µ µ µ − − ∈ ∈ + ∑ ∑  
s.t. 
(4)   ( )
* * ( ) ( | ( , )) ( ) / ( | ( , )) 0
j j k k j j j j k k j k k k a A a A a y a a a y a a y µ π µ β β π − − ∈ ∈ + − = ∀ ∑ ∑  
(5)   * * ( ) 0 , ( ) 0 j j j j k k k k a a a a a a µ µ ≥ ∀ ≠ ≥ ∀ ≠ . 
Pairwise identifiability says that 
  * * rank ( *) rank ( ) rank ( ) 1 jk j j k k a a a − − Π = Π + Π − .  
Let  , j k e e  be the basis vectors placing weight one on  * * , j k a a  respectively. Since 
( , ) ( *) 0 j k jk e e a − Π = , the null-space of  ( *) jk a Π  is the direct sum of the subspace 
spanned by ( , ) j k e e  and the subspace ( , ) j k ￿ ￿ µ µ  defined by 
  * ( ) ( | ( , )) 0
j j j j j j a A a y a a y µ π − ∈ = ∀ ∑ ￿  and  
  * ( ) ( | ( , )) 0
k k k k k k a A a y a a y µ π − ∈ = ∀ ∑ ￿ . 
 Plugging into the objective function, since 
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− − ∈ ∈








Thus, to show that the solution is bounded, it suffices to consider for  , i j k =  the simpler 
problem 
(6)  * max ( ) ( , )
i i i i i i i i a A a g a a µ µ − ∈ ∑  
s.t. 
(7)   * ( ) ( | ( , )) 0
i i i i i i a A a y a a y µ π − ∈ = ∀ ∑  
(8)    * ( ) 0 i i i i a a a µ ≥ ∀ ≠ . 
This is the dual of the linear program corresponding to (individual) enforceability, which 
is to maximize 0 subject to the incentive constraints for player j. Because profile 
* a  is enforceable, the primal has a solution, so this dual has a solution as well , and in 
particular is bounded.  
￿   